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Myers v. Reno Cab Co., Inc., 137 Nev. Ad. Op. 36 (July 29 2021).1 
 
EMPLOYMENT LAW: EMPLOYMENT STATUS UNDER NRS 608.155 
 
Summary 
The Nevada Supreme Court reversed and remanded consolidated appeals of a district 
court order granting summary judgment in minimum wage matters.  The question considered 
was whether the appellants were “employees” or “independent contractors” under the scope of 
the Minimum Wage Act and waiting time penalties for late-paid wages.  The employee status for 
the Minimum Wage Amendment (MWA) under the Article 15, Section 16 of the Nevada 
Constitution is determined only by the economic realities test.  The employee status for purposes 
of statutory waiting time penalties for late-paid wages may be affected by the presumption set 
forth in NRS 608.0155.  The court reaffirmed that a contractual recitation stating a worker is not 
an employee is not conclusive under either test and is determined by the facts presented to the 
court.  Further, employee status for the purpose of MWA or NRS Chapter 608 is not affected by 
the Nevada Transit Authority’s approval of a taxi lease under NRS 706.473.    The Court held the 
district court erred when granting NTA’s approval of appellant leases foreclosed further inquiry 
into their employee status and the Court reversed and remanded. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
In 2015, the drivers sued the taxicab companies alleging their pay was often less than the 
MWA requirement for minimum hourly wage.  The taxicab companies leased taxicabs to the 
drivers under agreements approved by the NTA, pursuant to NRS 706.473. 
The drivers argued they were in fact employees under the “economic realities” test as 
clarified in Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club.2  Terry involved the statutory right to a 
minimum wage, here, the drivers argued that the same test should apply to their MWA claims.  
In addition, the drivers alleged that they were not paid all the wages they were owed at the time 
of separation, entitling them to waiting time penalties under NRS 608.040. 
The cab companies moved for summary judgment, arguing that the drivers were 
independent contractors, not employees, for the purposes of the minimum wage laws. The 
district court initially denied the first motion, but then the court later granted the cab companies’ 
renewed motion.  The court based its decision solely on the fact that the drivers had NTA-
approved taxicab leases.  The court reasoned that when the NTA approves a lease pursuant to 
NRS 706.473, it confirms that the parties of the lease have entered a “statutorily created 
independent contractor relationship.”3 The court further held a worker who is an independent 
contractor under NRS 706.473 is not an employee for any purpose, and thus the protections 
afforded to “employees” by the MWA and NRS Chapter 608 did not apply.  The drivers 







1  By Colleen C. Freedman. 
2  Terry v. Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club, 130 Nev. 879, 336 P.3d 951 (2014). 
3  See Yellow Cab of Reno, Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 127 Nev. 583, 592, 262 P.3d 699, 704 (2011). 
Discussion 
Standard of Review 
The Court reviews de novo, the order granting a NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss.4  The 
facts are undisputed, and the existence of an employment relationship under a given test is a 
question of law that can be resolved at summary judgment.5  Under Doe Dancer, the proper legal 
test for MWA and NRS Chapter 608 is a question of law, which the Court reviews de novo.6  
 
A contractual disavowal of an employment relationship 
The Court first disposed the cab companies’ argument that the recitation in the lease 
agreement was conclusive evidence that the drivers were independent contractors for MWA and 
NRS Chapter 608 purposes.  Each agreement contained the following language: 
 
RELATIONSHIP: Neither Party is the partner, joint venture, agent, or representatives of 
the other Party.  LESSEE is an independent contractor.  LEASING COMPANY and LESSEE 
acknowledge and agree that there does not exist between them the relationship of employer and 
employee, principal and agent or master and servant, either express or implied, but that the 
relationship of the parties is strictly that of lessor and lessee, the LESSEE being free from 
interference or control on the part of the LEASEING COMPANY.  
 
The Court noted that employment relationships are not solely dependent on recitations 
within a contract and facts proven in court determine the worker’s actual employment status.  
Further, the Court rejects the cab companies’ application of Kaldi v. Farmers Insurance 
Exchange, where the Court relied on a contract provision to find that no employment relationship 
existed.7  However, Kaldi was not concerned with any “remedial statute” or constitutional 
provision, but only with an alleged contractual right to be free from termination except for good 
cause.8  In the instant case, the drivers seek to enforce a right that if they are employees under the 
appropriate tests, is guaranteed to them by law, not by contract. 
The Court held that a worker is not automatically an independent contractor solely 
because a contract says so. The court must determine employee status under the applicable legal 
test, based on all the relevant facts.  
 
NRS 706.473 does not affect the test for employment status under the MWA or NRS Chapter 608 
Next, the Court analyzed whether NRS 706.473 affected the test for employment status 
under the MWA or NRS Chapter 608.  This Court has held that a statutorily created independent 
contractor relationship exists as a matter of law when all the statutory and administrative 
requirements for creating an independent contractor relationship are satisfied.9  The drivers’ 
leases were approved by the NTA pursuant to NRS 706.473, which permits a company to lease a 
taxicab to an independent contractor.10  The district court held that because the NTA approved 
the drivers’ leases and all other administrative requirements were satisfied, the relationship 
 
4  Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). 
5  Terry, 130 Nev. At 889, 336 P.3d at 958. 
6  See Doe Dancer I v. La Fuente, Inc., 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 3, 481 P.3 860 (2021).  
7  Kaldi v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 117 Nev. 273, 21 P.3d 16 (2001). 
8  Id.  
9  See Yellow Cab, 127 Nev. At 592, 262 P.3d at 704. 
10  NEV. REV. STAT. 706.473 (2021).  
between the drivers and the companies was a “statutorily created independent contractor 
relationship” and the drivers were not entitled to protection of either the MWA or NRS Chapter 
608. However, this Court found the district court erred in its assumption that an independent 
contractor under NRS Chapter 706 is necessarily an independent contractor for all purposes.  
The Court held that an “independent contractor” does not have a single, universal meaning and 
because different statutes have different scopes and it is not unusual for a worker to be classified 
as an independent contractor for some purposes and as an employee for others.11  
 
NRS 706.473 cannot override the constitutional minimum wage guarantee 
The Court held that NRS 706.473 cannot preclude coverage under the MWA.  The court 
reasoned that Nevada’s Constitution guarantees a minimum wage to workers who satisfy the 
economic realities test and only the economic realities test determines whether a worker is an 
employee for the purposes of the MWA.12  Under the economic realities test, the court 
“examines the totality of the circumstances and determines whether, as a matter of economic 
reality, workers depend upon the business to which they render service for the opportunity to 
work.”13  Under this test, an independent contractor is one who, “as a  matter of economic fact, is 
in business for himself.”14  The Court held that regardless of a worker’s status under NRS 
706.473, is constitutionally entitled to a minimum hourly rage as long as a matter of economic 
reality a worker is dependent on the business to which she or he renders service, is not in 
business for herself or himself, and is not subject to the MWA’s express exceptions.  
 
The NTA’s sweeiping definition of “independent contractor” does not apply to NRS Chapter 608 
waiting time penalty claims 
The Court found the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the grounds 
that the NTA’s approval of the drivers’ leases rendered them independent contractors, and not 
employees, for all purposes. The issue is whether a driver whose lease is approved by the NTA, 
after satisfying all relevant requirements, is necessarily an independent contractor for purposes of 
NRS Chapter 608 and NRS 608.255.   
NRS 706.473 permits a taxicab company to lease cars to independent contractors.  NTA’s 
own regulations define “independent contractor” as “a person who leases a taxicab from a 
certificate holder pursuant to 706.473.”15  The NTA’s definition of independent contractor does 
not distinguish independent contractors from employees in a meaningful way and is 
fundamentally different than the type of independent contractor relationship relevant to the 
MWA or NRS Chapter 608.  The Court held that the “statutorily created independent contractor 
relationship” recognized in Yellow Cab is distinct from independent contractor status from MWA 
or NRS Chapter 608 purposes. 
 
NRS 608.0155 may affect a worker’s entitlement to waiting time penalties 
The Court disagreed with the drivers’ assertion that they were entitled to seek waiting 
time penalties under section (B) of the MWA, and their claim that if they were employees for 
constitutional purposes, they could seek statutory waiting time penalties regardless of their status 
 
11  Dynamenx Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 416 P.3d 1, 29 (Cal. 2018). 
12  See Doe Dancer 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 3, 481 P.3d at 867. 
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14  Henderson v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., 41 F.3d 567, 570 (10th Cir. 1994). 
15  NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 706.069. 
under NRS 708.0155.16  The Court held that when a plaintiff asserts both an MWA claim and 
NRS Chapter 608 claim, the court will analyze the economic realities test, and NRS 608.0155 
only applies to NRS Chapter 608 claims, it does not apply to MWA claims.17   
The court held the drivers stated two separate claims for relief: First, as relief for their 
MWA claim and second, NRS 608.040 claim they sought a judgment against the defendant for 
wages owed as prescribed by NRS 608.040.  Under the MWA cause of action, the drivers were 
seeking back pay, injunctive relief, punitive damages, and attorney fees.  However, nothing in 
the MWA provides availability of a separate statutory cause of action.  The court did not read the 
MWA as abrogating the requirement for the plaintiff to prove waiting time penalties under NRS 
608.040.  The worker must have resigned, quit or been discharged; the employer must have 
failed to pay the wages when due, if the worker resigned or quit, or within three days of when 
due, if the worker was discharged; and the worker must be an “employee” within the meaning of 
NRS Chapter 608.  The court did not read it as making such penalties available to a worker who 
does not satisfy the statutory definition of “employee.” 
 
Conclusion 
This Court could not decide as a matter of law whether the drivers were employees under 
either law.  Both the economic realities test and the NRS 608.0155 test may be fact intensive and 
the district court found certain material facts were disputed to which are potentially material to 
the drivers’ status under the MWA and NRS Chapter 608.  This Court reversed the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.  
 
Concurrence 
Justice Pickering wrote an opinion concurring with much of the majority’s analysis.  She 
agrees that the Court’s holding the contractual negation of an employment relationship does not 
control whether a working relationship is that of an employer and employee with the meaning of 
the MWA to the Nevada Constitution and that the resolution of the question turns on the fact-
intensive application of the economic realities test.  Further, Justice Pickering agrees with the 
NTA’s approval of a driver’s lease does not demonstrate that driver is an independent contractor 
for the purposes of Nevada’s minimum wage laws.  In regard to the majority’s holding that 
“NRS 608.0155 may affect a worker’s entitlement to waiting time penalties,” joins on the 
understanding that this outcome results from the way the drivers pleaded their waiting time 
penalty claims in the instant case, based in statute NRS 608.040, separate from their MWA 
claims.  Justice Pickering joined based on the understanding that the majority’s opinion did not 
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